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ESSAY
MY SUMMER VACATION:
REFLECTIONS ON BECOMING A CRITICAL
LAWYER AND TEACHER
MINNA J. KOTKIN*
I've spent my summer "vacation"' reading wonderful articles by
clinicians, critical legal theorists, and fellow travellers about lawyering
and teaching for an anthology I'm editing, entitled Critical Law-
yering.2 Having dumped my caseload on my long suffering colleague,3
I've had a bit of time to do what I'm always asking of my students, but
do so little of myself: reflect upon how to be a better lawyer.4 Given
all of this theory that I supposedly have mastered, have I actually
changed the way I do things? What do I do differently?
I've concluded that my teaching and lawyering have changed over
the fourteen years I've been in this business, but probably not enough.
* Professor of Law and Director, Federal Litigation Program, Brooklyn Law School. I
want to thank Jennifer Sinton for her excellent research assistance; my writing "buddies"
- Stacy Caplow, Susan Herman, Nan Hunter and Liz Schneider; Sara Kay (see infra note
3 and accompanying text); Liz Cooper; and my dog Boz. I also want to acknowledge the
support of Brooklyn Law School's summer research stipend program.
1 As I'm often told, we are so lucky to have the summers "off."
2 The anthology, CRITICAL LAWYERING: A READER (forthcoming, New York Univer-
sity Press 1998), is being brought out by the publishing arm of the same fine university that
sponsors this journal. This is not a paid advertisement, but simply "shameless self-promo-
tion." For more specific references, see Lawclinic Bulletin Board.
As is true of the above, this essay contains a number of references that may make
sense only to clinical teachers. If, by some odd chance, you happen to be a traditional
teacher reading this piece, please consult your local clinician. You might even think about
visiting the clinic.
I know you're asking, "So, what is critical lawyering, anyway?" Keep reading, or as
they say, see infra notes 9, 13-16, 22, 24 and accompanying text.
3 Why is it that tenured clinicians get to use summers to write, while short term con-
tract teachers, trying to break into the permanent job market, often have 11 month
commitments?
4 For an elucidation of the importance of reflection in clinical theory, see Robert Din-
erstein's opus. Dinerstein has written and performed several unpublished songs about re-
flection or reflective vision. They are: "Clin-ic" (to the tune of "Downtown"), performed
at the January 1985 AALS annual meeting ("Things will be great in the clinic/you'll be
reflective in the clinic/Everything's waiting for you."); "All My Teaching" (to the tune of
"All My Loving"), which Bob thinks was performed at the 1990 AALS Clinical Confer-
ence in Ann Arbor ("We'll reflect all the way/'bout the issues of the day."); and "Supervi-
sion" (to the tune of "Satisfaction"), also performed in Ann Arbor ("You will get some
supervision/We'll review your reflective vision.").
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Some changes relate to concerns that might be characterized as mun-
dane; some go to paradigmatic issues 5 of lawyer-client-teacher rela-
tionships. 6 For what it's worth, this essay discusses the changes that
may be of general applicability. In a sense, they fall into the category
of "things I wish someone had talked with me about when I started
teaching." But more importantly, I think they demonstrate the strug-
gle, in which all clinicians engage, to integrate theory into practice. I
hope that this essay will spark readers to submit their own reflections,
since this law review is intended to be, in clinical tradition, as interac-
tive as a law review can be.
THE BACKGROUND
Some background about the clinic that I direct, and the cases we
handle, will be useful in understanding my efforts to train critical law-
yers and, for that matter, to become one myself. As I have described
elsewhere,7 the Federal Litigation Program was designed to assist the
local federal courts in providing representation to pro se litigants, and
to provide students with training in pre-trial litigations skills, primarily
discovery and motion practice at the federal level. The clinic's
caseload is composed largely of individual discrimination actions: the
typical action involves an employee asserting that his or her termina-
tion was motivated by consideration of race, national origin, gender,
age, or more recently, disability. These cases comprise a substantial
percentage of pro se filings; few private lawyers, even in New York,
are willing to undertake such actions without a substantial retainer,
and then only when the facts suggest a high probability of success,
thus allowing for the possibility of recovering attorney's fees from the
defendant employer.
In some respects, these cases make excellent teaching vehicles.
The students' caseload is limited to two or three matters over the
course of the academic year. They have the benefit of close supervi-
sion through a student-faculty ratio of eight to one. This teaching en-
vironment enables students to fully assume the lawyer's role: they
interview and counsel our clients, negotiate with our adversaries, take
5 For a definition of paradigmatic issues, see the UCLA/Institute for Advanced Legal
Studies Fourth International Clinical Conference, "Conceptual Paradigms in Clinical Legal
Education," October 23-26, 1997. More "shameless self-promotion."
6 See you can put six fatuous footnotes in two paragraphs. Tenure-track clinicians take
note. I'll try to control myself now.
7 See Minna J. Kotkin, The Violence Against Women Act Project: Teaching a New Gen-
eration of Public Interest Lawyers, 2 J.L. & POL'Y 435 (1996). In fact, the following several
paragraphs are taken verbatim from this article, with permission, of course. It's always
important to cite yourself, to demonstrate the requisite amount of chutzpah, and it's not
plagiarism if it's your own article, is it?
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and defend depositions, draft and argue motions, and most impor-
tantly, develop case theory and plan case strategy. In rare circum-
stances, they may even try an action in federal court, although, as with
the federal court docket in general, the great majority of our cases end
in negotiated settlements.
Given its goals, the program has been a success. Students do in-
deed learn about pre-trial litigation skills, and the program does pro-
vide limited but not insignificant assistance to the courts. The
program is popular, even though it is notorious for its time require-
ments. It attracts many, but not exclusively, students with a strong
interest in pursuing public interest careers.
I have concerns, however, about the underlying messages that our
students learn about civil rights practice. Our clients file their claims
pro se with the firmly held belief that they have suffered discrimina-
tory treatment, that they will have their day in court, and that their
rights will be publicly vindicated. What they, and the students who
represent them, experience instead is the endlessly protracted and
often highly adversarial and difficult course of employment litigation
in federal court. Both the process and the substantive law works
against clients achieving their goals. Their cases go on for years,
delayed by discovery disputes and motion practice in which clients
rarely have a role. The law of employment discrimination, moreover,
does not lend itself to remedying subtle forms of discrimination.8
Most employers today are well versed in keeping the paper record
needed to support termination decisions. They document "good" rea-
sons for their actions, often making it difficult if not impossible to fer-
ret out the subjective judgments that suggest differences in treatment
on the basis of race or gender. Witnesses typically are still employed
by the defendant, and objective testimony is hard to come by.
Nevertheless, tenacious advocacy often produces not insignificant
monetary offers. Between the pressure exerted by the judiciary to
avoid these types of trials, the delays in obtaining a trial date, and the
uncertainty of a successful result, our clients almost uniformly
"choose" to settle. We both preach and try to practice client-centered
decisionmaking, but I often wonder how much we manipulate our cli-
ents into making this choice.
Indeed, the entire process of federal litigation seems to work
8 Among the compelling pieces on subtle or unconscious forms of discrimination and
the law are Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989); Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); and David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimina-
tion, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993). (This is the first "real" footnote, suggested by the
editors of this august journal.)
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against the goals of critical lawyering, which I define as lawyering
methodology that attempts to empower clients traditionally
subordinated by our legal system.9 Other than as criminal defendants,
clients are rarely seen or heard in the federal courts. They almost
never get to "tell their story," and their stories are often difficult to
shoehorn into the statutory requirements. 10
In addition, teaching in this context does not immediately lend
itself to developing students' critical consciousness. Even the most
public interest oriented students often become caught up in the "pro-
fessionalism" and elitism of the federal courts. They concentrate
much more on developing their deposition skills, for example, than on
their relationships with clients. They may be impressed by the experi-
ence, confidence and resources of the big firm lawyers who represent
the corporate defendants.
On reflection, I have realized that some of the changes in the way
I teach are attempts to provide an antidote to this less than ideal con-
text for teaching students to be critical lawyers. Despite the pro-
gram's limitations in this respect, the changes I've made in how I teach
and how I litigate at least suggest an effort to apply theory to practice.
What is most striking to me, however, is that the changes were not as
result of a conscious attempt to apply theory. Rather, they represent
the process of learning by osmosis: the unconscious application of my
reading and listening to critical and clinical theory." If there were
ever a question about the value of this scholarship, the following vi-
gnettes of things I do differently are a testament to its practical utility.
THE CHANGES
A. Feminist Legal Theory, or Wearing Pants to Court
Each year since I began teaching, a female student has ap-
proached me about whether she could wear pants to appear at a status
conference or a motion argument in federal court. Despite my femi-
nist convictions and substantial credentials, 12 I puzzled about how to
integrate feminist legal theory into this query. We know that feminist
jurisprudence seeks to expose how the law systematically privileges
9 The concept of critical lawyering shares conceptions of client empowerment with
various postmodernist schools of thought -- critical legal studies, feminist legal theory, crit-
ical race theory, queer theory and clinical legal theory. For a more serious discussion of
this subject, see Minna J. Kotkin, Creating True Believers: Putting Macro Theory into Prac-
tice (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author and looking for a home).
10 See, of course, Lucie White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday
Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BuFF. L. REV. 1 (1990).
11 See supra note 9 and infra notes 13-16, 22, 24 and accompanying text (referring to
works of critical and clinical theory).
12 I actually was in a consciousness raising group in 1969.
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masculine normative visions. 13 Cultural feminists suggest that
women's values have been long disregarded by liberal legal theory,
resulting in a body of doctrine that disempowers women and fails to
protect their interests.' 4 Radical feminists view gender inequality as
the result of a systematic attempt to maintain the subordination of
women.' 5 Postmodern feminists posit that only the destabilization
and subversion of gender identity can lead to greater gender equal-
ity.16 But how does all this translate into actual lawyering and
supervision?
In my pre-critical stage, the student dialogue used to go some-
thing like this:
STUDENT:
ME:
STUDENT:
ME:
STUDENT:
ME:
STUDENT:
ME:
Can I wear pants to court tomorrow?
What do you think [or how do you feel] 17 about wearing
pants to court?' 8
[Not a star in the clinic, this student has yet to pick up on
our subtle and sophisticated teaching techniques. She
responds in a puzzled tone.] Well, it's supposed to be eight
degrees out. I'd be a lot more comfortable.
Do you think it would have any impact on how the judge
perceives you or your client, particularly given that you're
a student?
Well, I'm not sure.
Have you spent much time observing proceedings in
federal court?
I've noticed that there aren't too many women lawyers,
and I guess they mostly wear suits with skirts, but -
Do you think being "comfortable" is worth the possibility
of prejudicing your client's interests?
By the time I finished with my non-directive supervision, the student
was ready to send her pants suit to the Salvation Army.
One day a few years ago, I said to myself after one of these con-
versations: "This is ridiculous." It is true that there are not a lot of
13 For a collection of essays on feminist jurisprudence, see FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY:
FOUNDATIONS (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993).
14 See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
15 See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: To-
ward Feminist Jurisprudence, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS, supra note 13,
at 427 (proposing a trajectory for feminist legal theory).
16 See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF
IDENTITY (1990).
17 This is for the "touchy/feely" school of clinical methodology. See Jane H. Aiken et
al., The Learning Contract in Legal Education, 44 MD. L. REv. 1047 (1985). Just kidding,
friends.
18 While this technique is sometimes known as non-directive supervision, I prefer to
think of it as getting my money's worth from years of therapy.
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women practicing regularly in the New York federal courts,19 and by
and large, those that do "dress for success" in a traditional way, which
means no pants. But if we continue to feed into this pattern, things
will never change. Would a judge actually take offense by a woman in
a pants suit in 1997?20 We'll never know until we try, and to the ex-
tent there is any adverse reaction, it's time to confront the issue and
educate the judiciary about gender discrimination in the almost 21st
century.
So, my response to the question is now more directive and pro-
active: "Yes, if it's a pants suit that's roughly equivalent to what men,
unfortunately, still have to wear to court. The tie is optional. But, be
aware that there are probably still some judges who will have a nega-
tive reaction. You'll have to be completely prepared, very profes-
sional and articulate to overcome his21 perceptions. To the extent
there is a risk to the client, you may want to discuss it with him/her,
but my philosophy is that this is a risk worth taking. We need to abol-
ish this vestige of discrimination in the courts."
So, I've become a more critical lawyer and teacher. Someday, I
may even progress to wearing pants to court myself.
B. Critical Legal Theory, or Bringing Clients to Court
Among the basic principles of critical legal theory are that the
procedural regularity of the litigation process disguises the political
content of decision-making and legitimatizes political results, and that
the culture of law works to mystify and disempower outsiders through
the dominance of professional legal discourse.22 Anyone who has
done plaintiff's Title VII litigation, as we do in the clinic, knows these
principles to be self-evident. Nothing is more disempowering for a
client than waiting a year for a judge to decide a summary judgment
motion, which if defendant wins, means that the client never gets to
"tell her story" in person. Or trying to understand her lawyer's expla-
nation of a six month long discovery dispute about whether the defen-
dant will turn over documents relating to other employees' claims of
19 Judith Resnick has commented on this phenomenon. See Judith Resnick, "Natu-
rally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1682 (1991).
20 I have not as yet confronted the converse situation, but when it comes, we'll see how
well I can stick to my new found critical (i.e. postmodern) sensibility.
21 This is a purposeful use of the male pronoun.
22 An excellent book by my colleague, Gary Minda, provides a cogent and accessible
summary of postmodern theory, including critical legal theory. See GARY MINDA,
POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END (1995).
See also CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (James Boyle ed., 1992); THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 1982).
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discrimination.
For many years, I did nothing to attempt to counteract the dead-
ening effect of the litigation process for clients, and the disconnection
with clients that the process fosters in lawyers. In fact, I contributed
to it, as demonstrated by the following supervisory dialogue:
STUDENT:
ME:
For the status conference that's scheduled for next week,
should we ask our client, Mr. Jones, to come?
[After the endless attempt to elicit from the student the pros
and cons of bringing the client to court,] Well, you can but
as we've discussed, there are risks. The judge may want
some information from the client, and we won't really be
able to analyze the situation before we get a response from
the client. For example, what if the judge says: "Mr. Jones,
are you available to have your deposition taken this week?"
and we needed more time to prepare him. While we would
never, of course, say that a client was unavailable when he
actually was, we might want to explain to the client that
"available" can mean different things. We can't do that if
he's in court. Also, our adversary hasn't met Mr. Jones yet.
He'll be able to get a sense of him if Mr. Jones is there,
which will help him prepare for his deposition. Finally, if
the judge gives us a hard time, or makes cracks about
students, Mr. Jones may lose confidence in us. So, what do
you think?
I'm embarrassed to admit that this is not a parody. I actually had
this kind of dialogue with students for a number of years. All of the
"cons" outlined above are real, but what about the "pros"? I did not
ask whether the client wanted to come to court, and whether the stu-
dent had fully explained what was going to happen. Nor did I suggest
ways that the "cons" could be minimized by preparing Mr. Jones for
the experience.
But most importantly, I did not seriously consider how alienating
the federal litigation experience is for clients who arrive at our door-
step with a sense that they have been grievously wronged, put their
case and their trust in our hands, and then lose any ownership in the
process of asserting their rights. We keep them informed, consult
them about significant strategic decisions, send them copies of papers
filed, and do all of the things that good lawyers should do. I've come
to realize, however, that attending court, even for the most trivial con-
ference, enables clients to experience, if not fully participate in, the
process. Sitting at counsel table with your team of lawyers (in the
clinical context, that usually means two students and a supervisor) has
meaning for most clients. And if the judge demeans the client's case,
as so often happens in Title VII litigation, the client gets a true picture
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of how our system of justice works. If the students are on their game,
the client also will see how we attempt to resist this system. It is an
opportunity to bring to clients a "critical" understanding of the law.
There is another reason for bringing clients to court. Judges and
adversaries see that the client truly cares about the case and is watch-
ing, with a layperson's perspective, how justice is done. It is easy and
not atypical for a judge, even a well-meaning one, to say, "Oh, not
another race discrimination case" in a courtroom full of lawyers. It is
unlikely that the same comment will be made when the "alleged" vic-
tim of the discrimination is sitting at counsel table. Clients being pres-
ent puts a human face on the racism and sexism that still exists in the
workplace.
My supervision is more efficient now. In response to the stu-
dent's question, I say "yes." The problem is that I may not take the
time to explain why: to integrate theory and practice. I have become
a more critical lawyer; I'm still working on becoming a more critical
teacher. And I'm thinking about the issues that relate to bringing cli-
ents to negotiations. 23
C. Critical Race Scholarship, or Telling Counter-Narratives as
Case Theory
One of the significant insights of critical race theory is that we
need to tell "counter-narratives" in court to provide outsider perspec-
tives.2 4 Here is an example of how I have resisted putting this theory
into practice.
STUDENT: We had a great interview with Mr. Jones. He was working
as a temporary doorman, and he was the only African-
American on the building staff. When a permanent
position opened up, they gave it to the white handyman
instead of him. His evaluations weren't great, but he
thinks there was a conspiracy against him. The other
workers didn't want him there, so he says that they got a
couple of tenants to write letters complaining about his
attitude. We're doing the fact memo now. You should
have it in a few days. 25
23 This is to suggest that there's another article on the way-another important schol-
arly technique, right up there with citing yourself.
24 See generally CRrrICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed.
1995) (collecting various works of critical race theorists).
25 Right.
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ME: Oh, no - not another conspiracy. You have to tell Mr.
Jones - I mean, counsel him - about the problem of
talking about conspiracies. As soon as our adversaries
hear that word in a deposition, they go for the jugular.
"Oh, there was a conspiracy, was there? And, who was
involved? Was it all of the other workers? And all of the
other tenants? They were all out to get you, weren't
they?" By the time [big firm name deleted] is done with
him, he'll look like a complete paranoid. So, you need to
talk to Mr. Jones about not using the word "conspiracy."
Again, embarrassing but true. From the viewpoint of critical race
theory, there exist, of course, conspiracies of the sort that Mr. Jones
describes. They are not paranoid fantasies. It's just that insiders -
including white plaintiff's counsel, as well as judges and adversaries -
have trouble perceiving them. Critical race theory has helped me re-
alize this, and I'm trying to analyze my responses to conspiracy claims
from a more critical perspective.
Here, I'm still struggling, however. As a teacher today, I might
have a more sophisticated dialogue with the student. But I still don't
know how to create case theories that reflect the subtle nature of ra-
cist, but perhaps unconscious, conspiracies in the workplace and to
present them to adversaries and courts in a convincing way. I'm in
need of more theory-practice scholarship by critical race writers.
D. Clinical Theory, or Trying to Stop Driving My Students Crazy
Clinical theory is premised on the view that experiential learning
is an excellent methodology for teaching students about law and law-
yering, and it occurs most effectively through role assumption: stu-
dents learn by acting in the role of the lawyer. In my nafve youth as a
clinical teacher, I wrote an article that examines at length 26 the genesis
of role assumption, and questions whether it is necessarily the best
methodology for every student.2 7 I suggest that a certain amount of
modeling for law students goes a long way.
Despite what I wrote in that piece, I largely follow the role as-
sumption premise in my clinic. The problem is that role assumption is
a difficult matter in federal Title VII actions. Two students doing their
first trial in federal court (which may well be their first ever court
appearance) over several days is not a pretty sight. A student's first
deposition - of a fully prepared corporate executive represented by a
big firm partner - also can be a daunting event for all concerned. As
26 It was pre-tenure, so there are lots of real footnotes.
27 See Minna J. Kotkin, Reconsidering Role Assumption in Clinical Education, 19 N.M.
L. REv. 185 (1989).
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my former colleague, Kathleen Sullivan, 28 has written about,29 prepar-
ing a -student for her first argument, which happens to be in the Sec-
ond Circuit, is a somewhat harrowing experience.
My view has been, however, that we can compensate for what
students lack in experience with lots of preparation and practice be-
forehand. So, for many years, I would rehearse the entire deposition
with a student, role-playing the critical parts again and again, in an
effort to teach T-funnel questioning and probing, follow-up and lock-
ing-in techniques. These role plays were preceded by the student's
preparation and revision, after my review, of a question and answer
script, often of twenty or thirty pages, with all exhibits attached.
By the time I was finished with the student, he was a basket case.
The technical aspects of deposition taking had been blown all out of
proportion, and the most important skills - thinking and being curi-
ous - had gotten lost in the details. In addition, the student's confi-
dence was, destroyed, and she was completely intimidated by the
prospect of the task ahead. I had some really ugly experiences using
this teaching methodology, including the time when a student slept
through his alarm on the morning of his first deposition and couldn't
be awakened by telephone. I think he was trying to tell me
something.
I've changed my teaching methodology for depositions and other
public appearances, as well as my general philosophy about preparing
students. First, as a general matter, I've found that the most impor-
tant thing that I can do is to help students be confident and to con-
vince them that they cannot do any real harm to their client or her
case, because I Won't let that happen. Second, I now recommend the
following principles of lawyering, which I myself hold, and I try to
convey to students:
1. There's usually nothing wrong with saying "I don't know, but
I'll find out," to an adversary or a judge. For students particularly,
who are so easily bluffed and are ill-equipped to bluff back, it's better
to be yourself and be honest.
2. There's nothing wrong with seeking assistance from your su-
pervisor in a deposition or in court. In depositions, I now have fre-
quent, although whispered, conferences with the student to ensure
good follow-up. It's not reflected in the transcript, and if our adver-
sary doesn't like it, it's just too bad, and I'll tell her so (in a civil way,
28 This is Kathleen A. Sullivan, who can now say: she is not the Kathleen Sullivan of
Stanford, she is the Kathleen Sullivan of Yale, which sounds better than the Kathleen Sulli-
van of Brooklyn.
29 See Kathleen A. Sullivan, Self-Disclosure, Separation and Students: Intimacy in the
Clinical Relationship, 27 IND. L. REV. 115, 148-49 (1993).
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of course).
3. The most important thing in learning to be a lawyer is not
technique, but thinking through and acting upon a well-developed
case theory. This usually means that while the traditional lawyering
tasks, such as discovery practice, are important, it is at least as valua-
ble to use your common sense and your pre-law school life skills, to
investigate and independently find proof that supports your client's
claim. How all of the public facets look is less important than the
content of what you're doing.
These principles are at the heart of clinical theory, although they
rarely find their way into clinical scholarship. They fall into the cate-
gory of "things I wish someone had told me when I started teaching,"
and are put forward here in the hope that some new teacher's students
may be spared.
CONCLUSION
At its best, clinical legal education provides much needed legal
services, teaches students lawyering skills and helps them to develop
self-reflective habits that will enable them to continue to grow as ex-
periential learners. But clinical programs also provide a rare labora-
tory-like practice setting.30 Students and teachers together can
explore new ways of representing clients, particularly those without
easy access to our legal system, and new strategies for forwarding
their legal and political interests. This essay is a first step on my part
to self-consciously address that process through the prism of critical
scholarship. I look forward to more summer vacations and more
things done differently.
30 See Robert A. Stein, The Future of Legal Education, 75 MiNmN. L. REv. 945, 950-51
(1991).
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